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I. INTRODUCTION
For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990, the United States
government initiated the forfeiture of Florida and Caribbean property
valued at $166,195,000. During this same period, federal seizures of
property in Florida and the Caribbean totalled $119,888,000. These
seizures alone exceeded by $4,555,000 the total value of all property
taken under the same federal authority in the rest of the United
States.'
The intent of this comment is to place in perspective the rights
of innocent lienholders of real property subject to forfeiture under
federal statutory authority. Toward this end, Part II of this paper
reveals how the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit distinguishes seizures from forfeitures in denying procedural
due process. Part IIU examines the evolution of the exigent
circumstance exception to due process rights and the controlling
Supreme Court precedents. Part IV presents the purposes and scope
of the federal civil forfeiture statutes. Part V describes how the
Second Circuit's reading of Supreme Court precedent is in direct
counterpoise to the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation. Part VI
demonstrates how the current federal forfeiture regulations fail to
acknowledge an explicit congressional mandate to provide expedited
The 1990 dollar volume of asset forfeitures in the Southern District of Florida
represented a 360% increase above the 1987 base year. U.S. ATr'Y., S. DIST. FLA., U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, INTERESTING FACTS (1991). The Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement
Task Forces of the U.S. government effected these seizures.
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relief to innocent lienholders. Part VII concludes by recognizing that
protection of due process rights benefits both the government and the
innocent lienholder of real property.
H. 900 RIO VISTA BOULEVARD,
FT. LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA
On August 27, 1979, Heidi of South Florida, Inc. was
incorporated in Florida.2 The following day this new corporation
acquired title to residential real property located at 900 Rio Vista
Boulevard in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.3 In September, 1984, the
United States seized that property. It was not until eight months
later, in May, 1985, that the government established probable cause
for a belief that this residential property constituted forfeitable
proceeds traceable to illegal drug trafficking.4
The corporate owner challenged the constitutionality of the property
forfeiture, alleging that the government's actions constituted a denial
of procedural due process.5 The United States Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held as follows and affirmed: "Under Calero-
Toledo it is well settled that no prior judicial determination that
seizure is justified is required when the government seizes items
subject to forfeiture. 6
The court distinguished the acts of seizure and forfeiture, with
seizure evidencing governmental authority to confiscate and hold
private property pending the outcome of a forfeiture proceeding. In
distinguishing seizure from forfeiture, the court acknowledged "the
only time property traceable to drug proceeds is not subject to
forfeiture is when the owner of the property establishes that this act
connecting the property with a drug transaction was done without the
2 United States v. 900 Rio Vista Boulevard, 803 F.2d 625, 627 (11th Cir. 1986).
3 Heidi Hartline, as president, director, and sole shareholder of the corporation,
executed the documents corresponding to this transaction. At the time, Ms. Hartline was
the girlfriend of Jonathan S. Baldwin. Baldwin was arrested in November of 1982 and
pleaded guilty to a drug trafficking conspiracy count. Id. at 627-28.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id at 632.
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owner's knowledge or consent."7 However, "seizure for purposes of
forfeiture presents an extraordinary situation justifying postponement
of notice and hearing."8
Therefore, in the Eleventh Circuit, an innocent owner is entitled
to notice and a hearing prior to forfeiture, but not prior to seizure.
The court grounded this due process interpretation in federal statutory
authority 9 and the Supreme Court's Calero-Toledo holding.'" To
fully appreciate this Eleventh Circuit interpretation, the applicable
federal statutes must be viewed within the context of the entire
Calero-Toledo opinion and its precedents.
IH. CALERO-TOLEDO AND THE
DUE PROCESS PRECEDENTS
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin" found certain
state prejudgment replevin statutes to be unconstitutional. The Court
took exception to a state authorizing the seizure of a property without
a prior hearing. Justice Stewart's opinion quoted Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp 2 in acknowledging: "due process is afforded only
by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' that are aimed at establishing
the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his
property."' 3  Further, under any state authorized seizure, "[tihe
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property'... has never been
interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership.
Rather, it has been read broadly to extend protection to 'any
7 Id. at 631.
8 Id. at 632.
9 Id. at 631-32.
10 Id. at 632.
1 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969).
13 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97. Justice Stewart's opinion recognized that "for more than
a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified." Id. at 80. "[T]he prohibition against the deprivation of property
without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional political
history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental
interference." Id. at 81.
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significant property interest'. '' 14  The Court also established that a
temporary denial of a property right "is nonetheless a 'deprivation'
in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.""5
Fuentes, however, unequivocally established that the right to
notice and a hearing prior to any deprivation of a property interest is
not inviolate. The Court found that, under exigent circumstances, the
government must subordinate certain individual rights to safeguard
the general welfare. Such subordination may include the postponing
of procedural due process rights. 6 Two years after Fuentes, the
Supreme Court employed this exigent circumstances standard in
deciding Calero- Toledo.'7
The postponement of notice and a hearing was deemed necessary
by the Court to ensure the seizure of a yacht. Such property "could
be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if
advance warning of confiscation were given."'" Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan stated that "[tlo the extent that such forfei-
ture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors
who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the
desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in
transferring possession of their property."19 However, before any
secured creditor should despair under the impact of this language,
Justice Brennan did offer language mitigating the Court's position:
14 Id. at 86 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). In the
Fuentes opinion, the Court specifically acknowledged the constitutional due process
protection of significant property interests against both state and federal actions. "The right
to a prior hearing has long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments." Id. at 82.
1s "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright line around three-day, 10-day or 50-
day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of a property by the State is within the
purview of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 85-86.
16 "There are 'extraordinary situations' thatjustify postponing notice and opportunity
for a hearing..... These situations, however, must be truly unusual." Id. at 90. The
criteria for establishing a truly unusual situation were specified by the Fuentes Court under
a three-pronged test. In order to legally postpone a due process notice and hearing, the
seizure must be necessary to protect "an important governmental or general public interest."
Second, very prompt action must be necessitated by a "special need." Third, the individual
effecting the seizure, under "the standards of a narrowly drawn statute," must be a
governmental agent responsible for determining the necessity of the act. Id. at 91.
17 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678 (1974).
18 Id. at 679.
19 Id. at 687-88.
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This is not to say, however, that the "broad sweep" of
forfeiture statutes ... could not, in other circumstances, give
rise to serious constitutional questions. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall intimated as much over a century and a half ago in
observing that a "forfeiture can only be applied to those cases
in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of
a forfeiture may be employed. It therefore has been implied
that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of
an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
taken from him without his privity or consent.2°
The Calero-Toledo opinion both expands and delimits the Fuentes
exigent circumstance standard. Although reinforcing the legitimate
privilege of a responsible government agent to postpone procedural
due process until after the seizure, the scheduling is not discretionary.
Notice must be "reasonably calculated" to inform a party with a
significant property interest of the pending forfeiture claim.21
Calero-Toledo confirms the procedural due process rights guaranteed
through the Fourteenth Amendment to a secured creditor threatened
by a state's forfeiture claim. While the burden of proof of innocence
rests upon the claimant, Calero-Toledo requires that the secured
creditor be afforded reasonable notice to permit a timely resolution.
In 1983, the Supreme Court expanded the exigent circumstance
standard to permit the postponement of due process in federal as well
as state confiscations. In the United States v. Eight Thousand Eight
Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United States Currency," the Court
found that:
[A]bsent an extraordinary situation a party cannot invoke
the power of the state to seize a person's property without a
prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified. But
we have previously held that such an extraordinary situation
exists when the government seizes items subject to
forfeiture.... Pearson Yacht clearly indicates that due
process does not require federal customs officials to conduct
20 Id. at 688-89.
21 Id. at 680, n.15.
22 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
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a hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture. Such a
requirement would make customs processing entirely
unworkable. The government interests found decisive in
Pearson Yacht are equally present in this situation: the
seizure serves important governmental purposes; a pre-seizure
notice might frustrate the statutory purpose; and the seizure
was made by government officials rather than self-motivated
private parties.23
Although this language is an adaptation of the exigent cir-
cumstances standard of Fuentes and Calero-Toledo, the emphasis
placed upon an "extraordinary situation" is evident.'
Sniadach, Fuentes, Calero-Toledo, and $8,850 identify the
transitory nature of wages, chattels, vessels, and currency,
respectively. Transitory properties are readily susceptible to
concealment, destruction or removal from a jurisdiction. However
the property seized in 900 Rio Vista Blvd was a single family
residence, not a mobile home, and therefore not subject to removal
from the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, absent an extraordinary situation,
the government seized this real estate. This governmental seizure
occurred without a prior notice or hearing. The government found
its authority for this act in a warrant issued in accordance with
Sections 881(a)(6) and (b)(4) of Title 21 of the United States Code.
Ironically, Section 881 (a)(6) provides the "other circumstances,
[giving] rise to serious constitutional questions" as Justice Brennan
warned in his Calero-Toledo opinion." Section 881(a)(6)26
codifies Justice Brennan's deference to a "constitutional claim of an
owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from
him without his privity or consent" regarding the illegal activity.
27
Unlike the state forfeiture statute upheld in Calero-Toledo, both
of the drug-related federal forfeiture statutes pertaining to real
2 Id. at 562 n.12. (Citations omitted).
7 If notice and a hearing were required prior to all seizures by authorized officials,
few customs laws could be effective. Concealable or destructible contraband, its
conveyances and proceeds would rarely survive the interval between notice and the hearing
"if advance warning of confiscation were given." Calero -Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679.
2 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688-89.
2 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1981).
V Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
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property provide for this innocent owner exception. 8 In 900 Rio
Vista Blvd., the Eleventh Circuit broadly applied a Calero-Toledo
holding grounded in a state law instead of recognizing the innocent
owner exception as provided in the applicable federal statute.
The Supreme Court has included mortgagors within this innocent
owner forfeiture exception since deciding the United States v. Stowell
in 1890.29 There, the Court found that the lender had no knowledge
of any prohibited use of the property prior to making the loan. As
a result, the mortgage was valid against any interests acquired by the
United States. Any forfeiture judgment had to be against the
mortgagee's equity of redemption only.3" Coincidentally, the Court
acknowledged the Congressional intent that a "forfeiture of land and
buildings shall not reach beyond the right, title, and interest of...
persons as have consented to the carrying on" of the prohibited use
of the property.3' More recently, the Eleventh Circuit has accepted
lienholders as innocent owners under 21 U.S.C. § 881.32
IV. THE FEDERAL CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES
In 900 Rio Vista Boulevard the government alleged that the
property constituted proceeds and was traceable to illegal drug
trafficking. Sections 881(a)(6) and (b)(4) provide for the civil
forfeiture of proceeds traceable to illegal drug trafficking.33 In
particular, Sec. 881(b) incorporates by reference the seizure
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
29 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
30 Id. at 248.
31 Id. at 246
32 Among the courts of appeals, two have recently concluded that a lienholder
qualifies as an owner under § 881. See In re Newport Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 928 F.2d 472,
476 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798, 799 (11th
Cir. 1991) (citing In re Metmor Financial Inc., the court affirmed the district court's finding
that an innocent lienholder was entitled to recover interest and principal). "[O]wner should
be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest
in the property seized." Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and Iln, Pub. L. No. 95-
633, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 9496, 9518,
9522-23). See also United States v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 946 F.2d 264, 266 (4th Cir.
1991).
33 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
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procedures set forth in the Federal Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims?4 When the government seized
900 Rio Vista Boulevard in 1984, Supplemental Rule C(3) made no
provision for a judicial review prior to seizure. A government agent
could make an independent determination that certain property was
related to illegal drug trafficking and therefore was subject to in rem
seizure and forfeiture.3 5
As of the date of the Eleventh Circuit's holding in 900 Rio Vista
Blvd., Rule C(3) had been amended to require either a judicial review
or the presence of exigent circumstances prior to the in rem seizure
of any property by the government.36  However, this 1985
amendment specifically excluded the necessity of judicial review for
any forfeiture actions by the United States when authorized by a
federal statute.3
7
The Advisory Committee Notes to this amendment explained two
grounds for exempting such authorized seizures from prior judicial
review or proof of exigent circumstances. First, the government's
criminal case might be prejudiced by the discovery disclosures
required in a civil forfeiture action. Second, subjecting the
government and the courts to both a civil and a criminal hearing on
the same issue was inefficient.
3
Yet, despite inefficiency and the risk of discovery disclosures, the
Advisory Committee acknowledged Rule C(3)'s subordination to
controlling Supreme Court due process precedents: United States v.
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars and Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 39 To the extent that a conflict exists
between Rule C(3) and due process, the Supplemental Rules yield to
these Supreme Court precedents.
The first sentence of Rule C(3)40 must be read to incorporate the
due process holdings of Calero-Toledo and $8,850; otherwise, the
4 Id.
35 FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. C(3).
36 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
39 Id.
40 "Except in actions by the United States for forfeitures for federal statutory
violations, the verified complaint and any supporting papers shall be reviewed by the court
.... I1 /d.
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rule eviscerates all Supreme Court due process precedent. While
such Supreme Court precedents have not specifically addressed in
rem rights, the holdings are unequivocal. Prior to any seizure, a
party whose property interests are to be affected is entitled to be
heard, absent a special governmental need necessitating prompt
action.41 Because the amended Rule C(3) already prescribes the
postponement of a hearing until after a seizure under exigent
circumstances,42 the first sentence is redundant, at least as far as the
affected interests of those other than the rem are concerned.
In addition to the prior hearing or judicial review requirement, the
Supplemental Rules impact the notice provisions of procedural due
process.43 With respect to federal statutory violations, the named
property is the accused party. Since the property is the defendant, its
seizure is actual notice of the government's action. The notice by
publication requirement is therefore more of an accommodation to
inform any ancillary interests in the seized property. Neither the type
of interest in nor the nature of the seized property are distinguished
within the due process scope of the Supplemental Rules.
900 Rio Vista Boulevard relies upon the absence of any Rule
C(3) distinction between real and personal property. 44  The court
referred to this rule due to a federal statute authorizing the forfeiture
of property connected with illegal drugs.45 This statute permits the
Attorney General to seize such property in accordance with the in
rem procedures of Supplemental Rule C(3).46
41 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
42 "If the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney certifies that exigent circumstances make
review by the court impracticable, the clerk shall issue a summons and warrant for the arrest
.... .FED  R. CIv. P. SUPP. C(3).
43 FED. R. CIv. P. SUPP. C(4). This rule delimits the necessity of notice to
publication in a general circulation newspaper. Those effecting a seizure must provide this
form of notice promptly if the seizor has not returned the property within ten days after
taking possession. Id. This statutory notice requirement finds coherence in the nature of
the in rem action. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. C(1). The property, rather than an owner, is
deemed to be the subject of the action.
44 United States v. 900 Rio Vista Boulevard, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir. 1986).
45 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
46 Id. at § 881 (b). The rule reads: Rule C(3) Judicial Authorization and Process
[hf the conditions for an action in rem appear to exist, an order so stating and
authorizing a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the
action shall issue and be delivered to the clerk who shall prepare the warrant and deliver it
to the marshall for service. FED. R. CIv. P. SuPP. C(3).
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On its face, the rule distinguishes only vessels and "other
property." The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1985 rule
amendment provide an explanation: "The new provision recognizes
that in some situations, such as when a judge is unavailable and the
vessel47 is about to depart from the jurisdiction, it will be
impracticable, if not impossible, to secure the judicial review
contemplated by Rule C(3)."48 The rule is designed to prevent the
removal of property from the district and the accompanying loss of
the in rem jurisdiction. The Advisory Committee Notes place rule
emphasis upon the risk of loss; not upon the type of property
involved. Rule application is specifically identified with property
threatened by imminent removal from the jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit in 900 Rio Vista Blvd. found that the
confiscation of a private home required no prior hearing or notice.49
The court made no attempt to reconcile the failure to give pre-seizure
notice where prior judicial review was neither impracticable nor
impossible. The court held that a seizure for the purpose of
forfeiture is inherently an exigent circumstance, regardless of the
circumstances. The Second Circuit, meanwhile, is in counterpoise to
the Eleventh's interpretation of a seizure as an exigent circumstance
per se.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In 1989, a Second Circuit panel ruled Calero-Toledo did not hold
that seizure for purposes of forfeiture without more was an
extraordinary situation justifying the postponement of notice and an
opportunity for hearing until after the seizure. Rather, the Court
expressly limited its holding, stating that "pre-seizure notice and
hearing are not required in the context of this forfeiture," i.e., a
47 A narrow reading of this note would restrict its scope to vessels. However, §
881(d) specifically adopts the seizure provisions of. the customs laws as applicable, to those
items identified under the statute as subject to forfeiture.
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
48 FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. C(3).
49 United States v. 900 Rio Vista Boulevard, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986).
152
IN REM CIVIL FORFEITURES
forfeiture presenting an extraordinary situation under the Fuentes
criteria.5 °
The Second Circuit also differed from the Eleventh Circuit in
construing procedures for the civil forfeiture of property connected
with illegal drugs. The Eleventh Circuit found that an in rem action
for forfeiture, when grounded in a federal statute, inherently
postpones all due process rights.5 The Second Circuit reads
Calero-Toledo as requiring a pre-seizure hearing "even in the context
of a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding" absent "extraordinary
circumstances., 52  The dispositive issue is whether exigent
circumstances exist "warranting the postponement of notice and the
opportunity for an adversarial hearing."53 Within the Calero-Toledo
context, the Second Circuit concluded, "[a]s a general matter, a
showing of exigent circumstances seems unlikely when a person's
home is at stake, since, unlike some forms of property, a home
cannot be readily moved or dissipated., 54  The court further held
that notice and a prior hearing were warranted for the forfeiture of
property interests even if a federal statute were violated.55
The Second Circuit opinion identifies three summary procedures
for property seizures related to federal statutory violations. First, the
Attorney General may seize such property pursuant to the
Supplemental Rules.56 Second, with probable cause to believe
50 United States v. 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1263-64 (2nd Cir.
1989).
S 900 Rio Vista Boulevard, 803 F.2d at 632.
52 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1263. This interpretation merely reflects
the Fuentes holding that parties with potentially affected property interests have a right to
a hearing before any seizure. To enjoy this right, both a notice and a hearing must precede
seizure, absent exigent circumstances. Otherwise, the right is illusory because the impacted
party has no true opportunity to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the seizure. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
53 4492 South Livonia Road at 1265.
5 Id. This holding assumes that any potential dissipation of property proceeds by
transfer or encumbrance could be precluded by a lis pendens, bond, restraining order, or
similar precaution. The threat of destruction could be met with insurance.
55 See Id. at 1263.
56 After the filing of a verified in rem complaint, Rule C(3) requires the clerk of the
appropriate district court to issue a warrant. The warrant shall provide for the seizure of a
vessel or other property named as the subject of the complaint. Under exigent
circumstances, this procedure is available without a prior hearing by a judicial officer. Id.
at 1262.
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certain statutory violations have occurred, the Attorney General may
seize any property involved. 7 Third, the Attorney General may
obtain a seizure warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.5" None of these three alternatives addresses
the due process rights of a party with an interest in seized property;
however, the Congress of the United States has attempted to resolve
this apparent dilemma.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL LETTER AND INTENT
In 1970, Congress decided to attack the increasing drug abuse in
the United States by passing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act.59 The short title for this law is the Controlled
Substances Act.60 The Crime Control Act, as passed by Congress
in 1984, added real property to the list of items that are subject to
forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act.61  Of equal
importance under this Act was the addition of subsection (h) to the
civil forfeiture statutes.
Under this subsection, "all right, title, and interest in property
[which is subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a)] shall vest
in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to the
forfeiture.. .. 6' As a result of these two amendments, any interest
in real property involved in a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act vests in the United States. The only codified exception to such
a forfeiture is based upon an owner's lack of consent to, or
knowledge of, such a violation.
57 Such a property seizure must follow the procedures set forth under the customs
laws. Id.
58 An ex parte probable cause determination by a judicial officer is a prerequisite to
the issuance of such a seizure warrant. Id. at 1262-63.
Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 1437 (to
be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971). The Federal Civil Forfeiture Statutes, 21 U.S.C. §
881, originated as Title H, Part E, § 511, Forfeitures, of the Controlled Substances Act. Id.
at § 511, 1485 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881).
60 Id at § 100, 1444.
6' Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1837,
2050 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)).
6 Id at 2051 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(h)).
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In 1988, Congress again amended the civil forfeiture statutes with
the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.63  Section 6079(a) of this
act required the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury
to prescribe regulations for expedited relief for seizures pursuant to
three previous acts: the Controlled Substances Act; the Tariff Act of
1930,64 and the Act of August 9, 1939 pertaining to "the possession
of personal use quantities of a controlled substance. '65  Section
6079(a) also prescribes that seizures under three civil forfeiture
statutes are subject to expedited administrative relief.'
One of these three statutes, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), authorizes the
forfeiture of all real property, including any right, title, and interest,
if related to a controlled substance violation.67 As mandated by
§ 6079(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Justice
6 Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4181.
64 This Tariff Act essentially constitutes the customs laws of the United States. 19
U.S.C. § 1-3206 (West 1978, 1980 & Supp. 1992).
6 Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6079(a), U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.)
4325. Congress mandated that such regulations shall:
(1) minimize the adverse impact caused by prolonged detention, and
(2) provide for a final administrative determination of the case within 21 days of
seizure, or provide a procedure by which the defendant can obtain release of the
property pending a final determination of the case. Such regulations shall provide
that the appropriate agency official rendering a final determination shall
immediately return the property if the following conditions are established:
(A) the owner or interested party did not know of or consent to the violation;
(B) the owner establishes a valid, good faith interest in the seized property as
owner or otherwise; and
(C) (1) the owner establishes that the owner at no time had any knowledge or
reason to believe that the property in which the owner claims an interest was
being or would be used in a violation of the law; and
(2) if the owner at any time had, or should have had, knowledge or reason
to believe that the property in which the owner claims an interest was being
or would be used in a violation of the law, that the owner did what
reasonably could be expected to prevent the violation.
An owner shall not have the seized property returned under this subsection if the
owner had not acted in a normal and customary manner to ascertain how the
property would be used. Id., § 6079(b) at 4326.
6 Id., § 6079(a) at 4325.
6 The other forfeiture statutes required to provide for the expedited administration
of claims against seizures are 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(4) and (6). Section 881(a)(4) subjects
all property rights in any conveyance to forfeiture if such a means of transportation were
involved with illegal drugs. Section 881(a)(6) essentially provides for the forfeiture of all
proceeds traceable to illegal drug activity. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
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Department promulgated amended civil seizure procedures to provide
expedited administrative relief. However, for some inexplicable
reason, these procedures failed to specifically address relief for real
property seizures despite the congressional mandate.
Section 1316.90 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations
defines the purpose and scope of Subpart F - Expedited Forfeiture
Proceedings for Certain Property.68 The section states that
expedited forfeiture proceedings are to follow the congressional
intent "to minimize the adverse impact on those entitled to legal or
equitable relief occasioned by the prolonged detention of property
subject to forfeiture due to violations of law involving personal use
quantities of controlled substances, and conveyances seized for drug-
related offenses."69 But no language in either the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 or the real property civil forfeiture statute, § 881(a)(7),
so delimits the explicit congressional intent.70
The first sentence of the amended federal regulations, § 1316.90,
states that "[tihe following definitions, regulations, and criteria are
designed to establish and implement procedures required by sections
6079 and 6080 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No.
100-690 (102 Stat. 4181). 7' However, § 6079 separately and
distinctly requires these expedited relief procedures for real property
subject to forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act.72 Title
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) codifies this real property authority.
Therefore, § 1316.90 of the federal regulations includes, by
6 Drug Enforcement Admin., Justice, 21 C.F.R. § 1316.90 (1991).
6 Id. at § 1316.90(a).
70 The caption of Title VI of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 reads "Anti-Drug
Abuse Amendments Act of 1988." Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4312. The heading for Subtitle B of that Title VI is "Asset
Forfeiture Amendments." Id. at 4320. § 6079(a) of Subtitle B requires that the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe expedited relief procedures for
specified types of seizures. Included in these types of seizures are those pertaining to
statutory violations involving personal use quantities of controlled substances. Id. at 4325.
The current federal regulations may highlight this aspect of Congress' intent, but the
language of the 1988 Act provides the scope of the legislative purposes. Among those
stated purposes is the expedited relief for interests affected by the government's seizure of
real property. See supra text preceding note 66.
71 Id.
72 Id
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reference, real property among those interests afforded expedited
relief after a seizure by the government.
While § 881(a)(7) specifically addresses real property, the term
"personal use quantities" or the equivalent does not appear in this
subsection. Therefore, in accordance with the language of both the
1988 Act and the real property forfeiture statute, any affected owner
is entitled to expedited relief. Such relief begins with a timely notice
of governmental seizure. Again, the current federal regulations
specify notice procedures when implementing these expedited relief
measures.
Section 1316.99, Notice provisions, of Title 21 C.F.R. states
under subdivision (b): "Standard notice provision. The standard
notice to the owner as required by title 19, U.S.C. § 1607 and
applicable regulations, shall be made at the earliest practicable
opportunity after determining ownership of the seized property or
conveyance and shall include the legal and factual basis of the
seizure."
73
The last sentence referring to notice in the above referenced §
1607 reads: "Written notice of seizure together with information on
the applicable procedures shall be sent to each party who appears to
have an interest in the seized article". 74  By incorporating the
referenced provisions of section 1607, the Justice Department's
regulations literally require written notice of the seizure. More
importantly, this written notice shall be sent at the earliest practicable
date to each party appearing to have an interest in the seized proper-
ty. 75
Section 1607 pertains to the seizure of items valued at $500,000
or less.76 Although this section fails to define what constitutes an
interest in the seized property, Eleventh Circuit case law does. "Full
protection of an innocent owner's interest was mandated by
73 Drug Enforcement Admin., Justice, 21 C.F.R. Sec. 1316.99 (1991) (emphasis
added).
74 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
75 21 C.F.R. § 1316.99 (1991).
76 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. 1991). A literal reading of this statute would not provide
for notice to those holding significant interests in affected real property. However, for
seizures authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 21 C.F.R. 1316.99 employs, by specific
reference, the notice provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1607. See 21 C.F.R. § 1316.99 (1991); Act
of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6079(a), U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4325.
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Congress.... "7 7  Full protection must include both substantive and
procedural due process rights. Accordingly, absent exigent
circumstances, section 1607 protects an innocent owner's right to a
pre-seizure notice and hearing regarding property valued at $500,000
or less.
Section 1610, Seizure; Judicial Forfeiture Proceedings, requires
condemnation proceedings be initiated by the United States attorney
for any seizure not subject to section 1607.78 Rule 71A of the
Rules of Civil Procedure govern federal proceedings for the
condemnation of real and personal property. Subdivision (c)(2),
Complaint Contents, provides that "prior to any hearing involving the
compensation to be paid for a piece of property, the plaintiff shall
add as defendants all persons having or claiming an interest in that
property whose names can be ascertained by a reasonably diligent
search of the records."79 Therefore, regardless of value, the customs
laws acknowledge the due process rights of notice to each party
appearing to have an interest in a seized item. More importantly, the
customs laws place an affirmative duty upon the government to
inform. each party in interest of any pending confiscation procedure.
No distinctions or exceptions are given for in rem proceedings.
Further, the Justice Department's own regulations for drug
77 United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798, 799 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
As referenced in Part Il, the Eleventh Circuit includes lienholders among innocent owners
under 21 U.S.C. § 881. See supra note 31 and the preceding text.
78 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (Supp. 1992).
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(C)(2). The Advisory Committee Notes to subdivision (c) of
Rule 71A read:
[T~he plaintiff is initially required to join as defendants only the persons
having or claiming an interest in the property whose names are then known.
This is [sic] no way prejudices the property owner, who must eventually be
joined as a defendant, served with process, and allowed to answer before
there can be any hearing involving the compensation to be paid for his piece
of property. The rule requires the plaintiff to name all persons having or
claiming an interest in the property of whom the plaintiff has learned and,
more importantly, those appearing of record. By charging the plaintiff with
the necessity to make "a search of the records of the extent commonly made
by competent searches of title in the vicinity in light of the type and value
of the property involved" both the plaintiff and the property owner are
protected. Id.
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enforcement administration require notice at the earliest practicable
opportunity regardless of the type of proceedings.80
VII. CONCLUSION
Property as the proceeds or situs of illegal drug trafficking is
subject to forfeiture. However the drug-related federal forfeiture
statutes pertaining to real property provide for an innocent owner
exception. The term innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881 includes
mortgagees. The knowledge and consent of an owner are the only
statutory grounds specifically stated as dispositive for the exception
to apply.81 Congress has mandated full protection of an innocent
owner's interests. Therefore "the government can succeed to no
greater interest in the property than that which belonged to the
wrongdoer whose actions have justified the seizure. '82 The holder
of legal title, including the government, is obligated to an innocent
mortgagee for the full amounts provided in the controlling debt
so See supra note 71.
SI See United States v. One Urban Lot Located at 1 Street A-i, 865 F.2d 427, 430
(lst Cir. 1989).
82 In re Metmor Financial Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1987). The
wrongdoer's "equity was subject to an obligation to repay the borrowed principal and to pay
interest on the unpaid balance until all of the principal was repaid." Id. at 449. "It is the
general rule that a holder of equity of redemption can redeem from the mortgagee only on
paying the entire mortgage debt." Id. (quoting Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 579 n.7 (1935)). The forfeiture cannot change the nature of an
innocent mortgagee's rights. "The government cannot 'deprive mortgagees of substantial
incidents of their rights to resort to mortgaged property."' (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 44 (1960)) (describing the holding in Radford, 295 U.S. at 555). Id.
at 451. "Nor can the government significantly interfere with Metmor's use and enjoyment
of its property." Id.
"To the extent that 'innocent' owners have a stake in [property that
constitutes illegal proceeds of narcotics transactions], no forfeiture can occur.
Where .. . that stake encompasses a right to receive continuing interest
payments on unpaid principal, ... the innocent owner is entitled to receive
such payments from the government, even after the property has been seized,
until the principal is repaid." Id.
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instruments. These amounts include principal, interest, and the
lender's costs and attorneys' fees.83
The current federal regulations provide expedited relief
procedures for innocent owners under the civil forfeiture statutes.
The applicable federal rules and regulations require written notice of
seizure at the earliest practicable opportunity to an affected creditor
with a publicly recorded lien. Such relief procedures and notice are
in accordance with Supreme Court due process precedent. Parties
with significant property interests potentially affected by a seizure are
entitled to a hearing. To protect this right to be heard, notice of the
hearing must precede seizure absent an extraordinary situation.
Seizures for the purpose of forfeiture are not extraordinary
circumstances per se. Extraordinary or exigent circumstances turn on
the likely concealment or dissipation of contraband, its conveyances
or proceeds. Where transitory properties are involved pre-seizure
notice might frustrate the statutory purpose which is to prevent the
imminent removal of the affected property and the accompanying
loss of jurisdiction. Property susceptible to concealment, destruction
or removal would rarely survive the interval between notice and the
hearing if the government gave an advance warning of seizure.
Therefore, under such exigent circumstances, the procedural due
process rights of all significant interests in the seized property may
be postponed.
The government violates its constitutional limits by postponing
the procedural due process rights of significant interests in real
property affected by a statutory seizure. A lis pendens notice,
insurance, and other safeguards are available to protect both the
innocent lienholder's and the government's interests after a pre-
seizure notification.
Typically, the lienholder's interest is protected already with
sufficient insurance to restore the property to whatever extent might
be necessary. Therefore, any government interest in the
83 United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798, 799 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Relying upon In re Metmor Financial, Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh
Circuit found that "the loan documents provided lien status for interest payments required
until the principal balance was fully paid." Id. at 799. Further, the same panel held that
"to deny the Bank its costs and attorneys' fees, though provided in its loan documents,
would be a deprivation of its rights in the forfeited property." Id.
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complementary equity portion is also protected. The lienholder and
the government have the same interest: to maximize the net proceeds
ultimately realized from the property.
An innocent mortgagee's nonforfeitable foreclosure right may
appear to conflict with the government's desire for custody to protect
the realization of liquidation proceeds. Yet summary foreclosure
proceedings permitting early liquidation benefit the respective
positions of both parties, particularly in a declining real estate
market. The only issue is which party is better prepared to handle
the property disposition after forfeiture. After the judicial perfection
of a forfeiture action, legal title vests in the government effective
with the first occasion of the proscribed act. Since title vests subject
to any mortgage, the innocent mortgagee is entitled to recover all
amounts due under the debt instruments from the responsible
party." Responsibility accompanies title. Accordingly, the
government must pay to the lender all of the amounts accrued under
the mortgage since the effective forfeiture date. Where legal title
remains with the United States, the government is obligated to the
mortgagee for all amounts due under the debt instruments. Such
obligations could result in disproportionately reduced proceeds
available to the government if liquidation is protracted.85 To
expedite the liquidation of property, early mortgagee involvement
through procedural due process is crucial.
Procedural due process is necessary to determine whose interests
are subject to seizure and forfeiture due to an illegal act. More
importantly, only due process will reveal whose interests warrant
protection from a forfeiture occasioned by an illegal act. Any act
contrary would be tantamount to punishing the victim as well as the
perpetrator. Undeniably, the innocent mortgagee is a victim of the
84 See supra note 80.
85 "The drug-forfeiture statute does not make the entire piece of physical property
'guilty;' it says that property shall not be forfeited 'to the extent of the interest of an
[innocent] owner;' it thereby permits an innocent mortgagee to recover the value of its
interest as a matter of right." In re Newport Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 928 F.2d 472, 476 (1st
Cir. 1991).
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wrong-doer's act. Substantive and procedural due process rights
identified by Congress and the courts provide protection for that
innocent mortgagee
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